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Abstract 
This paper revisits the results of Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013) examining the 
impact of R&D on the performance of US firms, especially through spillovers. We extend 
their analysis to include an additional 15 years of data through 2015, and update the measures 
of firms' interactions in technology space and product market space. We show that the 
magnitude of R&D spillovers appears to have been broadly similar in the second decade of the 
21st Century as it was in the mid-1980s. However, there does seem to have been some 
increase in the wedge between marginal social returns to R&D and marginal private returns 
with the ratio of marginal social to private returns increasing to a factor of 4 from 3. There is 
certainly no evidence that the need to subsidize R&D has diminished. Positive spillovers 
appeared to increase in the 1995-2004 boom. 
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1 Introduction
Research and Development (R&D) spillovers have been a major topic in the growth,
productivity and industrial organization literatures for many decades. Theoretical
studies have explored the impact of research and development (R&D) on the strategic
interaction among firms and long run growth.1 While many empirical studies appear
to support the presence of technology spillovers, there remains a major problem at
the heart of the literature. This arises from the fact that R&D generates at least two
distinct types of “spillover” effects. The first is technology (or knowledge) spillovers
which may increase the productivity of other firms that operate in similar technology
areas, and the second type of spillover is the product market rivalry effect of R&D.
Whereas technology spillovers are beneficial to firms, R&D by product market rivals
has a negative effect on a firm’s value. Despite a large amount of theoretical research
on product market rivalry effects of R&D (including patent race models), there has
been very limited econometric work on such effects, in large part because it is difficult
to distinguish the two types of spillovers using existing empirical strategies.
It is important to identify the empirical impact of these two types of spillovers.
Econometric estimates of technology spillovers in the literature may be severely con-
taminated by product market rivalry effects, and it is difficult to ascertain the direc-
tion and magnitude of potential biases without building a model that incorporates
both types of spillovers. Furthermore, even if there is no such bias, we need esti-
mates of the impact of product market rivalry in order to asses whether there is over-
1See, for example, Aghion and Howitt (1992) or Spence (1984). Keller (2004), Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (2005) and Jones (2005) all have recent surveys of the literature.
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or under-investment in R&D. If product market rivalry effects dominate technology
spillovers, the conventional wisdom that there is under-investment in R&D could be
overturned.
One way to address this issue was introduced by Bloom, Schankerman, and Van
Reenen (2013), hereafter BSV. Their methodology tried to separately identify two
types of research and development (R&D) spillovers: technology spillovers which are
beneficial and arise when knowledge flows to the firm from other firms which use
similar technologies, and product market rivalry spillovers which are harmful and
arise due to business stealing of the firm’s competitors. This is accomplished by
distinguishing between firms’ position in technology space, measured by patenting
across technology classes, and position in product market space, measured by sales
across four digit industries.
In this paper, we use the BSV methodology to separately identify the technology
spillovers and the product market rivalry effects of R&D and reexamine the effect of
R&D spillovers on several firm outcomes (market value, patenting, productivity, and
R&D). Our panel data includes nearly three times as many firms as BSV because
of updates to the underlying data sources and the passage of time. The magnitudes
of spillovers are quite similar to those reported in BSV. We find large statistically
significant technology spillovers and smaller product market rivalry effects. Inter-
estingly, and in contrast to the earlier results, we find that R&D of firms’ product
market rivals reduces patenting. We also find somewhat stronger evidence of strate-
gic complementarity in R&D among firms. Finally, we use our estimates to conduct
a welfare analysis, showing that the marginal social return to R&D (57.7%) exceeds
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the marginal private return to R&D (13.6%) by 44.1%. We then show how our es-
timates of constant technology spillovers can be reconciled with endogenous growth
models in which technological innovation is the main driver of economic growth.
The original BSV paper built on a long line of research, perhaps most saliently the
work of Griliches (1992). Many authors have subsequently extended this approach.
Manresa (2015) generalizes the approach to modeling spillovers in a modified panel
data “Pooled” Lasso approach. Lychagin et al. (2015) take a semi-parametric ap-
proach and introduce a third spillover aspect based on geographical closeness, which
they show is independently important. Colino (2017) adds a dynamic spillover mea-
sure which takes into account when past R&D may create future spillovers using
citation information (finding this particularly important in industries with complex
products that build cumulatively on multiple components).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data and
measurement of key variables, including the measures of technological proximity
and product market proximity which are central to the analysis. Next, we review
the econometric framework and theoretical predictions of the BSV model of firms’
production, patenting, and knowledge production. We then present the estimation
results and conduct a welfare analysis. Finally, we show our estimates are consistent
with endogenous growth models and in particular with recent papers studying the
productivity slowdown, before concluding with a few remarks.
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2 Data
In this section we discuss the construction of our dataset, highlighting where updates
have been made to the BSV data. The complete dataset and all replication files are
available online at https://people.stanford.edu/nbloom/research.
2.1 Sample Construction
We combine three primary data sources to create the analysis sample. First, data
on firm patenting and patent citations are from the NBER Patent Data Project.2
The NBER patent data includes data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) on the universe of utility patents granted between 1976 and 2006 in addi-
tion to firm identifiers (gvkey) which allow matching patent data to accounting data
from Compustat. Updates to the NBER patent data allow us to significantly increase
the sample of patenting firms for two reasons. Whereas BSV included utility patents
which had been granted by 1999, recent updates allow us to include patents granted
through 2006. In addition, the NBER’s match of patent assignee to the Compustat
firm identifier ”gvkey” has been improved, allowing us to identify more patenting
firms throughout the entire period of analysis.
Second, we use the Compustat Segments database which breaks down firm sales
by line of business. Each line of business is associated with a primary industry code
(4-digit SIC), and in many cases a secondary industry code. For lines of business with
two codes listed, we allocate 75 percent of the line’s sales to the primary industry and
25 percent to the secondary industry. We use Compustat Segments data from 1980
2https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home
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through 2015, whereas BSV used Segments data from 1993 through 2001. Finally, we
merge both the patent data and the line of business data to accounting data (sales,
employment, R&D, market value, etc.) for 1980 through 2015 from the Compustat
Fundamentals database.
2.2 Measuring Technological Proximity
Technological proximity is measured using the Jaffe (1986) metric as well as the Ma-
halanobis generalization introduced in BSV. Both measures describe the correlation
of patenting across USPTO technology classes between pairs of firms. To calcu-
late technological proximity, we first allocate all of the firm’s patents between 1970
and 2006 into the different USPTO technology classes, defining for firm i the vector
Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, ...Ti426) where Tiτ is the share of firm i’s patents in technology class
τ . The Jaffe (1986) measure of technological proximity between firm i and firm j is
given by:
TECHij =
(TiT
′
j)
(TiT ′i )1/2(TjT
′
j)
1/2
. (1)
The pool of technology spillovers to firm i in year t, SPILLTECHit, is the the
stock of R&D of all the firms with which firm i interacts in technology space, weighted
by the Jaffe (1986) measure of technological proximity. Specifically,
SPILLTECHit =
∑
j 6=i
TECHijGjt, (2)
where Gjt if firm j’s stock of R&D in year t.
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2.3 Measuring Product Market Proximity
Product market proximity is measured using line of business data from the Compu-
stat Segment Dataset, which provides each firm’s sales disaggregated by four digit
industry code. We begin by defining the vector Sit = (Si1t, Si2t, ..., Si473t), where Sikt
is the share of firm i’s sales in industry k from year t− 5 to year t− 1. Rather than
pool across all years to construct firm industry sales share, we pool the previous
five years of data. Pooling the segments data across all 35 years is problematic in
this setting. Future industry sales shares are clearly endogenous as firm innovation
and R&D affects subsequent product market success. Past sales shares do not suffer
from endogeneity but will be mismeasured if firms move in product space over time.
While the results in BSV are robust to using lagged, future or pooled segments data,
our data cover a much longer time period which likely exacerbates the endogeneity
and measurement problems introduced by pooling the data. We therefore use the 5
previous years of firm sales in order to (a) minimize reverse causality between firm
outcomes and product market competition and (b) accurately measure the firm’s
time t location in product market space. The results do not appear sensitive to
this choice – using the firm’s previous 10 years or 20 years of sales produces similar
estimates. Product market proximity is measured by the correlation of firms’ sales
across four digit industries:
SICij =
(SiS
′
j)
(SiS ′i)1/2(SjS
′
j)
1/2
. (3)
The pool of product market spillovers to firm i in year t, SPILLSICit, is the
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stock of R&D of all the firms with which firm i interacts in product market space,
weighted by our measure of product market proximity. Specifically,
SPILLSICit =
∑
j 6=i
SICijGjt, (4)
2.4 Mahalanobis Extension
We also construct alternatives versions of SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC using
the Mahalanobis distance metric. This measure allows for spillovers between differ-
ent technology classes, which is ruled out by the Jaffe metric (which assumes full
spillovers within the same class and nothing otherwise). In summary, Mahalanobis
measures cross technology class spillovers by using revealed preference. If two tech-
nologies are often located together in the same firm (e.g. “computer input/output”
and “computer processing”) then we infer the distance between the technologies is
smaller, so spillovers will be greater. We proxy this by the share of times the two
technology classes are patented within the same firm.
To explain the exact calculation of the Mahalanobis normed measure we require
additional notation. First, we let T = [T ′1, T
′
2...T
′
N ] denote the (426, N) matrix where
each column contains a firm’s patent shares in the 426 technological classes. Second,
we define a normalized (426, N) matrix T˜ = [T ′1/(T1T
′
1)
1/2, T ′2/(T2T
′
2)
1/2...T ′N/(TNT
′
N)
1/2],
in which each column is simply normalized by the firm’s patent share dot product.
Third, we define the (N ×N) matrix TECH = T˜ ′T˜ . This matrix TECH is just the
standard Jaffe (1986) uncentered correlation measure between firms i and j, in which
each element is the measure TECHij, exactly as defined in equation 1 above. Fourth,
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we define a (N, 426) matrix X˜ = [T
′
(:,1)/(T(:,1)T
′
(:,1))
1/2...T ′(:,426)/(T(:,426)T
′
(:,426))
1/2] where
T(:,i) is (1, N) and is the i
th row of T . This matrix X˜ is similar to T˜ , except it is
the normalized patent class shares across firms rather than firm shares across patent
classes. Finally, we can define the (426, 426) matrix Ω = X˜ ′X˜ in which each element
is the standard Jaffe (1986) uncentered correlation measure between patent classes
(rather than between firms). So, for example, if patent classes i and j coincide fre-
quently within the same firm, then Ωij will be close to 1 (with Ωii = 1), while if they
never coincide within the same firm Ωij will be 0.
The Mahalanobis normed technology closeness measure is defined as TECHM =
T˜ ′ΩT˜ . This measure weights the overlap in patent shares between firms by how close
their different patents shares are to each other. The same patent class in different
firms is given a weight of 1, and different patent classes in different firms are given
a weight between 0 and 1, depending on how frequently they overlap within firms
across the whole sample. Note that if Ω = I, then TECHM = TECH. Thus,
if no patent class overlaps with any other patent class within the same firm, then
the standard Jaffe (1986) measure is identical to the Mahalanobis norm measure.
On the other hand, if some patent classes tend to overlap frequently within firms -
suggesting they have some kind of technological spillover - then the overlap between
firms sharing these patent classes will be higher.
2.5 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
To be included in our sample firms must have segments and accounting data at
some time between 1980 and 2015, and must have applied for a patent at some
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point between 1970 and 2006. We also drop firms with less than 4 years of data
and with large jumps in sales and employment in consecutive years, which may be
indicative of M&A activity. We exclude the first 5 years of data (1980-1984) from
all regressions in order to construct the knowledge stock measures. Table 1 contains
summary statistics for several key variables for the 1,985 firms in our sample in
columns 1-3, and for the sample in BSV in columns 4-6. Summary statistics are
presented over the period from 1981 to 2001 to facilitate comparison between the
two samples. Compared to BSV, the firms in our sample have higher Q, are more
R&D-intensive measured by R&D stock, flow, and stock scaled by physical capital,
and they patent more often. Our firms are on average smaller in terms of market
value, sales, physical capital, and employment than the firms in the old BSV sample
because the increased match sample included many medium and smaller Compustat
firms.
3 Econometric Framework
We are interested in estimating the effects of R&D spillovers and product mar-
ket rivalry on four firm outcomes: market value, R&D spending, productivity, and
citation-weighted patenting. Theory has clear predictions for the first two firm out-
comes, while productivity and patenting are used to proxy for knowledge. Market
value should be increasing in the size of the pool of R&D spillovers from techno-
logically similar firms (SPILLTECH) and decreasing in the size of the pool of
spillovers from product market rivals (SPILLSIC). Patenting and productivity
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should be increasing in SPILLTECH. Lastly, the theoretical predictions for the
effects of spillovers on R&D vary depending on whether R&D undertaken by firms’
product market rivals is a strategic substitute or a strategic complement. R&D is
increasing in SPILLSIC in the case of strategic complements and decreasing in the
case of strategic substitutes. The relationship between R&D and SPILLTECH is
ambiguous because it depends on how technology spillovers affect the firm’s marginal
product of R&D.
3.1 Market Value Equation
We estimate the effect of R&D spillovers on market value in the following specifica-
tion:
ln(Qit) = γ1φ[ln
(
G
A
)
it−1
] + γ2 lnSPILLTECH it−1 + γ3 lnSPILLSICit−1
+ γ4X
V
it + η
V
i + τ
V
i + ν
V
it ,
(5)
where Qit is Tobin’s Q, φ[
(
G
A
)
it−1] is a function of the lagged R&D stock divided
by the stock of non-R&D assets (which we will approximate by a sixth order poly-
nomial), XVit is a vector of time-varying controls, and η
V
i and τ
V
i are firm and year
fixed effects respectively.
3.2 Patent Equation
We estimate a negative binomial of citation-weighted patents:
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Pit = exp(λ1 lnGit−1 + λ2 lnSPILLTECHit−1 + λ3 lnSPILLSICit−1
+ λ4X
P
it + η
P
i + τ
P
i + ν
P
it ),
(6)
where Pit is future citations weighted patents for firm i’s patents applied for in
year t and Git−1 is lagged R&D capital stock. The firm fixed effect ηi is measured as
the pre-sample average citation-weighted patents. One concern with using citations-
weighted patents is that more recently issued patents have had less time to garner
citations than older patterns. We address this by including year fixed effects in all
specifications.
3.3 Productivity Equation
The production function is Cobb-Douglas in R&D capital, labor, and non-R&D
capital, with additional terms for R&D spillovers:
lnYit = ψ1 ln git−1 + ψ2 lnSPILLTECH it−1 + ψ3 lnSPILLSICit−1
+ ψ4X
Y
it + η
Y
i + τ
Y
i + ν
Y
it ),
(7)
where Yit is real sales, Xit includes labor and capital, and η
Y
i and τ
Y
i are firm and
year fixed effects.
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3.4 R&D Equation
R&D factor demand is:
ln
(
R
Y
)
it
= α2 lnSPILLTECH it−1 + α3 lnSPILLSICit−1
+ α4X
R
it + η
R
i + τ
R
i + ν
R
it ,
(8)
where Rit is the flow of R&D spending.
4 Results
The estimates of the market value equation are presented in Table 2. All specifica-
tions, in this table and throughout the paper, include year and firm fixed effects. In
column (1) we present the estimates from BSV for comparison. In column (2) we
find a strong positive relationship between SPILLTECH and market value and a
strong negative relationship between market value and SPILLSIC. R&D by tech-
nologically similar firms increases firm value.3 Conversely R&D by firms’ product
market rivals reduces firm value. Interestingly these coefficient estimates are remark-
ably similar to those reported in BSV and reproduced in column (1). In columns
(3) and (4) we include only the technology spillover or the product market compe-
tition spillover, and the estimated spillover effects are somewhat smaller but overall
very similar. Column (5) uses the Mahalanobis metric to measure the distance be-
3The ln(R&D/capital) coefficient reported in Table 2 is the implied elasticity of market value
with respect to R&D/capital evaluated at the sample mean R&D/capital ratio. Standard errors
are calculated using the delta method.
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tween firms in product market space. Recall that while the Jaffe measure imposes
zero spillovers across different technology classes (industries) for TEC (SIC), the
Mahalanobis metric allows for these inter-class (inter-industry) spillovers by using
the empirical co-patenting (co-sales) rates to measure the distance between different
technology classes (product markets). Using the Mahalanobis metric increases the
coefficient estimates of both spillovers measures by roughly 60 percent in absolute
magnitude. Finally, in Column (6) we estimate the market value equation using R&D
tax credits to instrument for SPILLTEC and SPILLSIC. While the relationship
between product market spillovers and market value is essentially unchanged com-
pared to our preferred specification with the Jaffe metric and firm fixed effects in
column (2), the positive association between technology spillovers and market value
falls by two-thirds. This suggests there could be a positive bias possibly because
market value shocks to a technology sector leads all firms to increase innovation.
Table 3 displays the estimates of the patent equation. In column (2) we regress
cite weighted patents (using a negative binomial count data model) on our two
spillovers measures, the R&D stock, a firm pre-sample fixed effect which controls for
the firm’s average citation weighted patents in the pre-sample period4, and lagged
patents. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on ln(R&D Stock) confirms that firms with
more R&D capital produce more patents. We find a somewhat smaller positive
relationship between SPILLTECH and patenting compared to BSV, and a negative
relationship between SPILLSIC and patenting in contrast to BSV’s finding of no
significant relationship. Omitting either SPILLSIC in column (3) or SPILLTEC
4The pre-sample period is defined as the 5 years before the firm enters the regression sample.
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in column (4) attenuates the remaining spillover coefficients slightly. The estimates
using the Mahalanobis measure and the Jaffe measure with instrumental variables
are quantitatively similar to the fully specified model in (2).
Table 4 summarizes the estimates of the production function. Comparing column
(1) and column (2), the results on our new sample are similar to the old estimates,
although we find slightly larger positive effects of technology spillovers on produc-
tivity. There is no significant relationship between product market spillovers and
productivity, with the coefficient on log SPILLSIC estimated precisely and close to
zero. The inputs in production – labor, physical capital, and R&D capital – enter the
production function positively and significantly. The productivity effects are similar
when we use the Mahalanobis measure in column (5) or use tax credit instruments
in column (6).
The R&D-intensity estimates are summarized in Table 5. We find a positive
relationship between both types of spillovers and R&D-intensity. In our preferred
specification a 10% increase in SPILLTEC is associated with an 12.5% increase in
R&D-intensity; a 10% increase in SPILLSIC is associated with a 5.4% increase in
R&D-intensity.
In summary, our updated estimates are similar to the findings in BSV with one
exception - our finding in Table 3 of a strong negative relationship between firm
patenting and R&D of the firm’s product market competitors. This can be rational-
ized in a model with endogenous patenting decisions. The intuition is that R&D by
firm’s competitors reduces the marginal benefit of R&D and thus the firm’s propen-
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sity to patent.5
5 Changes over time
In this section we assess how the spillovers estimates have changed over time by
allowing the coefficients of interest in equations 5, 6, 7, and 8 to vary over time.
This allows us to distinguish between the extent to which changes in the coefficient
estimates are due to a changes in the underlying sample and data versus changes
in the nature of spillovers over time. The estimates are broadly stable over time
although there do appear to be some significant changes in the spillovers parameters
around the time of the late 1990s dot-com boom and some evidence of changes in the
returns to R&D in recent years. In the following paragraphs we discuss the estimates
from each equation in turn.
In Table 6 we assess how the R&D coefficients have changed over time in the
market value regressions. We re-estimate 5 and interact dummy variables for each 5-
year time period with the technology spillover variable, the product market spillover
variable, and firm R&D/capital (note that the period 1985 to 1989 is the baseline 5-
year period).6 Columns 1, 2, and 3 shows the time-varying estimates of the coefficient
on technology spillovers, product market spillovers, and R&D/capital, respectively.
Estimated technology spillovers and product market rivalry effects in columns 1
and 2 are quite stable over time, with one notable exception. Positive technology
5See BSV Appendix A.3.
6For this exercise we only include the the first-order term of firm R&D/capital, omitting the
higher-order terms in 5. Including the second through sixth order terms with each of the five-year
time period dummies would require estimating an additional 30 coefficients.
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spillovers were 48% larger and negative product market rivalry effects 38% smaller on
average during the ten years encompassing the dot-com boom of 1997-2001.7 Before
and after the dot-com boom, the estimates are very flat over time and we find no
statistically significant changes in the spillovers estimates over time. In contrast to
the stable estimates of spillovers, the returns to R&D appear to be decreasing over
time, especially in the last 15 years of the sample. The estimated returns to R&D are
14% lower from 2000 to 2004 compared to 1985-1989, and the difference is significant
at the 10% level. In the next 5 years from 2005 to 2009 the estimated returns are
27% lower, and in the last five years from 2010 to 2015 they are 37.4% lower, with
both differences again relative to the 1985-1989 estimates and significant at the 1%
level.
Table 7 allows the coefficients in the Patent equation to vary over time. The
results in Table 7 also suggest higher knowledge spillovers and lower product market
rivalry effects from 1995 to 2004. However since our patent dataset ends in 2005 it
is difficult to identify trends in the estimated coefficients, and more so to distinguish
between a possibly temporary relationship during the dot-com boom versus longer
term trend.
The time-varying estimates for the Productivity equation are presented in Table
8. Again the estimates are reasonably stable over time. In contrast to the Market
Value Equation, there is much less evidence of an effect of the dot-com boom on
estimated technology spillovers. Aside from a small statistically significant increase
from 1995 to 1999, we find no change in the technology spillovers parameter over
7For technology spillovers: 0.5*(0.115+0.112)/0.237=0.478. For product market rivalry:
0.5*(0.019+0.042)/0.081=0.377.
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time. The estimate of the coefficient on ln(SPILLSIC) is also quite stable over time.
Except for the first 5 years of the sample, 1985-1989, the estimated coefficient on
ln(SPILLSIC) is always statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Finally, we examine how the estimates of the R&D equation have changed over
time in Table 9. In contrast to the earlier results, the coefficients on ln(SPILLTEC)
and ln(SPILLSIC) do appear to be trending over the past 30 years. In particular the
estimated coefficient on ln(SPILLTEC) has decreased over the sample, especially in
the past 10 years, suggesting less strategic complementarity among technologically
similar firms. Indeed in the last 5 years of the sample we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on ln(SPILLTEC) is equal to zero. Conversely, the
coefficient on ln(SPILLSIC) have been trending up over time. There is no statistically
significant relationship between product market spillovers and own R&D from 1985
through 1994, while from 1995 through 2015 we do find evidence of positive and
increasing strategic complementary of R&D among product market rivals.
To summarize the results from this section, the estimates of technology and prod-
uct market spillovers have been quite stable for the 30 years in our sample. From
1995 to 2005 we find greater technology spillovers and smaller negative product
market spillovers. This is strongest in the market value equation regressions with
log(Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variable, but present in the patent and productivity
equations as well. Our interpretation is that this reflects the market exuberance
for high-R&D firms around the time of the dot-com boom. We also see increasing
strategic complementarities in R&D among product market rivals, and decreasing
strategic complementarity among technologically similar firms.
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6 Welfare implications
What do these estimates imply about the marginal social return to R&D? We con-
duct a simple welfare analysis as in BSV to determine how the updated results affect
estimates of the marginal private return (MPR) to R&D and the marginal social
return (MSR). The marginal private return measures the change in firm output due
to an increase in firm R&D, and the marginal social return measures the change in
aggregate output due to an increase in firm R&D. Under certain simplifying assump-
tions.8, BSV show that we can calculate the marginal private return as
MPR =
Y
G
(ψ1 − σγ1), (9)
where σ is the share of the reduction in market value which is due to a decline
in output as opposed to a decline in price and is assumed to be one half, γ1 is the
the elasticity of market value with respect to SPILLSIC, and ψ1 is the elasticity of
output with respect to the R&D stock.
Similarly, the marginal social return can be calculated as
MSR =
Y
G
(ψ1 + ψ2), (10)
where Y
G
is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ1 is the elasticity of production
with respect to R&D stock and ψ2 is elasticity of production with respect to the
technology spillovers SPILLTEC. The formula for MSR captures the effect of
8Specifically, if all firms are the same in terms of their sales and R&D stock, all firms have
the same linkages with other firms in technology and product market spaces, and the coefficients
estimated in the previous sections are causal.
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increasing R&D on the firm’s own output through ψ1 and it’s effect on other firms
through ψ2.
Evaluating the marginal social return at the median output to R&D stock ratio
(2.345), MSR=2.345*(0.015+0.231)=0.577, or 57.7%. Similarly, the marginal private
return evaluated at the median ratio of output to R&D stock is MPR=2.345*(0.015-
0.5*(-0.086))=0.136, or 13.6%. That is, we find that under this simple calculation
the social return to R&D greatly exceeds the private return, by 44.1%. Compared
to the original results, we find a similar marginal social return (57.7% versus 55.0%)
and a smaller private return (13.6% versus 20.7%). The smaller private return is
due to a smaller output elasticity with respect to R&D capital (ψ1) as our estimate
of the elasticity of market value with respect to product market rivalry (γ1) is very
similar to the original results. Meanwhile, our estimate of a very similar social return
to R&D reflects the fact that our lower estimate of ψ1 is closely offset by the higher
estimated output elasticity with respect to technology spillovers (ψ2). In short, the
ratio of social to private returns has increased from a factor of 3 in BSV to a factor
of 4.
We can also analyze how the marginal social return of R&D has changed over time
using our time-varying estimates of the spillovers coefficients from Tables 6 through
9. Note that the MSR is equal to the sum of the production elasticities ψ1 and ψ2
divided by the R&D stock as a share of GDP. In calculating the marginal social return
above, we have used the median R&D to sales ratio in our sample of Compustat firms
as our estimate of the R&D stock as a share of GDP. On the one hand this is a natural
choice as it is an accurate measure for the sample of firms on which we have estimated
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the spillovers parameters, with the median chosen to reduce the influence of outlier
firms. On the other hand, our sample necessarily contains R&D-intensive, publicly
listed firms and so using this perhaps unrepresentative measure of changes in the
R&D stock-GDP ratio over time may lead us to mischaracterize the evolution of the
MSR. Thus, we also compare our estimates of the MSR to a version which uses the
aggregate ratio of US business enterprise R&D (“BERD”) stock to GDP ratio (from
OECD data) instead of the Compustat median R&D.9
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the MSR from 1985 through 2015. The solid black
line shows the MSR setting Y/G to the year-specific median Compustat R&D stock
divided by sales. The MSR is similar in 2015 to 1985 at around 0.63 at the beginning
and 0.60 at the end. In between, it dipped somewhat at the end of the 1990s but
then rose again in the following 15 years. The dotted line sets Y/G equal to the
aggregate business R&D stock divided by GDP and is normalized to have the same
level as the Compustat measure in 1985 to highlight changes in the series over time.
This measure rises through the mid-1990s and gently falls thereafter. By 2015 the
series returned to roughly the same level as in 1985. Since the coefficients we use
are the time-varying values from Tables 6 and 8, the differences in the two lines
are generated solely by the different paths of the R&D to output ratios in the two
sources. Overall, there is no strong pattern upwards or downwards and we conclude
9There are many differences between the two measures in addition to using the median vs. the
(weighted) mean. First, BERD is based on R&D conducted in the US regardless of whether it is
by US listed firms or foreign branches of multinationals. Compustat R&D is the global amount of
R&D by a US-listed firm even if this is conducted overseas. Second, BERD includes firms who are
not publicly listed. Third, the exact definitions vary with Compustat based on GAAP accounting
regulations and BERD based on the Frascati manual definition. Fourth, whereas a firm’s Compustat
R&D is publicly available, the firm-level data from BERD surveys are not publicly available.
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that the MSR has been broadly stable over this 30 year period.
7 Relationship with endogenous growth models
An interesting question is how do our estimates of R&D spillovers reconcile with
standard endogenous growth models? Bloom et al. (2017) note that many new
growth models can be described by a steady state or ideas growth equation of the
form:
A˙
A
= piR, (11)
where these are economy-wide values. This implies that ideas growth ( A˙
A
) is
proportional to a measure of research effort R. pi can be thought of as a measure
of research productivity - it is the degree to which an absolute given amount of
research effort translates into growth. These models imply that constant research
effort should lead to constant exponential growth. 10 Unfortunately, equation (11) is
not easily reconcilable with the data as the number of US researchers has increased
substantially over time whereas US TFP growth rates have not. Alternatively, semi-
endogenous growth models (e.g. Jones, 1995; Kortum, 1997) allow for diminishing
returns to research productivity (β ≥ 0 ):
A˙
A
= αA−βR. (12)
10For example, in Romer (1990) what is defined here as R is called HA, or “total human capital
employed in research.”
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The pure endogenous growth model (e.g. Romer, 1990) is when β = 0 so pi = α.11
In our framework, the ideas stock is given by the aggregate R&D knowledge stock,
which is a combination of firm-level G and the aggregation of SPILLTECH. The
economy-wide production function can be written:
Y = AσK1−βLLβL (13)
with 0 < σ ≤ 1 . The marginal social return to the R&D knowledge stock is:
dY
dA
= σ
Y
A
(14)
If we assume that at the aggregate level there is little depreciation of the knowl-
edge stock, research effort R can be thought of as the change in the economy’s
knowledge stock, A˙. 12 The change in the ideas stock is then simply:
A˙ = R. (15)
which implies that the growth rate of ideas (gA =
A˙
A
) is:
gA =
A˙
A
=
R
A
or
11Note that we could change R in equation (12) to Rλ where 0 < λ ≤ 1 to allow for “stepping on
toes” effects of duplicative research, but we keep to λ = 1 for simplicity due to the disagreement in
the literature of what an appropriate value should be (see Bloom et al. 2017 for a discussion).
12The private knowledge stock is likely to depreciate as firms copy each other and old R&D is
made obsolete. But as Griliches (1992) argued the social knowledge stock depreciation will be
substantially lower and possibly zero.
23
A = R/gA (16)
Substituting this expression for A back into the MSR formula (14) gives:
dY
dA
= σ
gA
(R/Y )
(17)
Equation (17) shows that the MSR is determined by the degree of diminishing
returns to the idea stock (σ), the fundamental growth rate of new ideas (gA, which
in semi-endogenous growth models is not affected by R&D in the long run) and the
R&D to GDP ratio (R/Y ). A more general derivation of equation (17) is in Jones
and Williams (1998) - see their equation (16) for example.
Our finding of a broadly stable social return to the US R&D stock in the last 35
years (Figure 1) is consistent with the stability of the objects on the right hand side
of equation (17). This conclusion might seem surprising in the light of the evidence in
Bloom et al. (2017) that research productivity as measured by pi in equation (11) has
been declining over time. But this evidence is consistent with what we would expect
when growth can be described by equation (12) and β ≈ 1, as research productivity,
pit is falling over time as At grows. Growth would have slowed by a lot more had R
stayed constant, but in fact R/Y has stayed broadly constant which is the same as
saying R&D has risen as the economy has grown and this offsets the fall in pi. This
conclusion echoes Jones and Williams (1998) who showed the consistency between
the social returns estimates in the micro productivity literature (which we broadly
follow) and more formal macro endogenous growth models (as investigated in Bloom
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et al, 2017).13
8 Conclusion
This paper has updated the results of Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013).
We include an additional 15 years of data in our analysis of the effects of spillovers on
firm value, productivity and R&D, and an additional 6 years of data in our analysis
of the effects of spillovers on firm patenting, increasing our sample size by two to
three fold. The updated estimates are broadly similar to the original findings. We
show that there are large positive spillovers among technologically-close firms, and
negative spillovers from product market rivals due to the business stealing effect. In
contrast to Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) we find a negative effect of
rivals’ R&D on firm knowledge production as measured by citation-weighted patents.
Back-of-the-envelope welfare calculations confirm the earlier paper’s findings of a
sizable wedge between the social and private returns to R&D. Indeed, our estimates
suggest that the wedge may be even larger.
The additional data also allows us to explore the changing natures of technology
and product market spillovers over time. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that estimated
spillovers are remarkably stable over the three decades we study. There are several
exceptions, most notably elevated technology spillovers around the time of the dot-
com boom of 1997-2001 which may reflect market enthusiasm for R&D-intensive
13Jones and Williams (1998) show how the kind of social returns to R&D estimates built from
R&D augmented Cobb-Douglas production function like equation (7) relate to the formal semi-
endogenous growth models reflected in equation (12). In short, a log-linearized approximation of
the production function for ideas (12) around the steady state growth path can be mapped into our
estimate of the social rate of return.
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firms, however the broad finding is of relatively unchanging spillovers from both
technologically close firms and firms which are close competitors in terms of product
markets. Finally, we show how our framework for estimating welfare implications of
R&D spillovers, in which we find a roughly constant marginal social return to R&D
over the past thirty years, can be reconciled within the framework of a standard
semi-endogenous growth model.
9 References
Aghion, Philippe and Howitt, Peter (1992), “A model of growth through creative
destruction,” Econometrica, 60, 323-51.
Bloom, Nick, Charles I. Jones, John Van Reenen, and Michael Webb (2017), “Are
Ideas Getting Harder to Find?” NBER Working Paper 23782.
Bloom, Nick, Mark Schankerman, and John Van Reenen (2013), “Identifying
Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry,” Econometrica, 81: 1347-1393.
Colino, David (2017), “Cumulative Innovation and Dynamic R&D Spillovers,”
MIT mimeo.
Griliches, Zvi (1992), “The Search for R&D Spillovers,” Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 94, 24-97.
Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the
Global Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Jaffe, Adam (1986), “Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence
From Firms’ Patents, Profits and Market Value,” American Economic Review, 76,
26
984–1001.
Jones, Charles (1995), “R&D based models of Economic Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy, 103(4), 759-784.
Jones, Charles and John Williams (1998), “Measuring the Social Returns to
R&D,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1119-1135.
Jones, Charles (2005), “Growth and Ideas,” in Philippe Aghion and Stephen
Durlauf (eds) Handbook of Economic Growth, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Keller, Wolfgang (2004), “International Technology Diffusion,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 42(3) 752-782.
Klenow, Peter, and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (2005), “Externalities and Growth,”
In Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol 1A, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf,
817-64. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Kortum, Samuel (1997), “Research, Patenting and Technical Change,” Econo-
metrica, 65(6), 389-1419.
Lychagin, Sergey, Joris Pinkse, Margaret Slade and John Van Reenen (2016),
“Spillovers in Space: Does Geography Matter?” Journal of Industrial Economics
64(2) 295-335.
Manresa, Elena (2015), “Estimating the Structure of Social Interactions Using
Panel Data,” MIT mimeo.
Romer, Paul M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political
Economy, 98 (5), S71-S102.
Spence, Michael (1984), “Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Perfor-
mance,” Econometrica, 52, 101-121.
27
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Median Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D.
Tobin’s Q 1.77 3.3 4.17 1.41 2.36 2.99
Market Value 255 4,053 15, 946 412 3,913 16,517
R&D Stock 43.3 863.4 3,491 28.7 605 2,722
R&D Stock/Capital 0.4 0.97 1.68 0.17 0.47 0.91
R&D Flow 6.96 145 586 4.36 104 469
Technology Spillovers 50,679 70,902 65,801 20,091 25,312 19,942
Prod. Market Spillovers 20,066 38,145 49,284 2,007 6,494 10,114
Patent Flow 1 26.2 134.5 1 16.2 75
Cite-weighted patents 5 179 698 4 116 555
Sales 210.38 3,897 24,560 456 2,879 8,790
Physical Capital 49.2 1,180 4,990 122 1,346 4,720
Employment 1,700 15,169 43,424 3,839 18,379 52,826
New Sample Old Sample
Notes: The means, medians, and standard deviations are taken over all non-missing observations
between between 1981 and 2015 for Columns 1 through 3 and between 1981 and 2001 for Columns
4 through 6. Columns 1 through 3 include the new analysis sample which contains 1,985 firms.
Columns 4 through 6 present summary statistics for the sample of 705 firms in Bloom, Schankerman,
and Van Reenen (2010).
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Table 2: Market Value Equation
Old Sample New Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.381*** 0.324*** 0.284*** 0.519*** 0.102*
(0.113) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.056)
ln(SPILLSIC) -0.083*** -0.086*** -0.066*** -0.135*** -0.085***
(0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023)
0.496** 0.324*** 0.321*** 0.331*** 0.319*** 0.339***
(0.069) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
1st Stage F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 3439.1
ln(SPILLSIC) 863.8
Observations 9,944 29,688 29,688 29,688 29,688 26,403
ln(R&D/Capital)
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Tobin’s Q) defined as the market value of equity plus debt,
divided by the stock of fixed capital. All columns include firm and year fixed effects. Standard
errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using
the Newey-West correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3: Patent Equation
Old sample New sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.417*** 0.284*** 0.259*** 0.365*** 0.269***
(0.056) (0.043) (0.042) (0.057) (0.044)
ln(SPILLSIC) 0.043 -0.079*** -0.038* -0.128*** -0.087***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023)
ln(R&D Stock) 0.104*** 0.170*** 0.167*** 0.200*** 0.174*** 0.120***
(0.039) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
ln(patents) 0.420*** 0.514*** 0.514*** 0.514*** 0.514*** 0.537***
(0.02) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Pre-sample FE 0.292*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.136*** 0.152***
(0.033) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
1st Stage F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 629.2
ln(SPILLSIC) 216.7
Observations 9,023 21,810 21,810 21,810 21,810 14,789
Notes: Dependent variable is citations-weighted patents. Estimation is conducted using the Neg-
ative Binomial model. Standard errors allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. All
columns include time dummies, four digit industry dummies and lagged firm sales. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
30
Table 4: Productivity Equation
Old Sample New Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.191*** 0.236*** 0.231*** 0.269*** 0.287***
(0.046) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
ln(SPILLSIC) -0.005 -0.01 0.005 -0.008 -0.01
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.011)
ln(Capital) 0.154*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.130***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(Employment) 0.636*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 0.686*** 0.694*** 0.694***
(0.015) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(R&D Stock) 0.043*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1st Stage F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 4183.7
ln(SPILLSIC) 914.3
Observations 9935 27566 27566 27566 27566 27390
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls
for current and lagged industry sales in each firm’s output industry. Standard errors in brackets
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West
correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 5: R&D Equation
Old Sample New Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.1 0.125*** 0.032* 0.093** 0.198***
(0.076) (0.034) (0.019) (0.04) (0.046)
ln(SPILLSIC) 0.083** 0.054*** 0.019* 0.095*** 0.050*
(0.034) (0.017) (0.01) (0.021) (0.026)
ln(R&D/Sales) 0.670***
(0.01)
1st Stage  F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 3362.2
ln(SPILLSIC) 760.8
Observations 8579 28130 27794 28130 25090
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(R&D/sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects
and controls for current and lagged industry sales in each firm’s output industry. Standard errors
in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the
Newey-West correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 6: Market Value Equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SPILLTEC) ln(SPILLSIC) ln(R&D/capital)
Baseline (1985 ≤ t < 1990) 0.2372*** -0.0813*** 0.163***
(0.044) (0.014) (0.01)
1990 ≤ t < 1995 0.015 0.005 -0.012
(0.017) (0.009) (0.011)
1995 ≤ t < 2000 0.115*** 0.019** -0.008
(0.017) (0.009) (0.011)
2000 ≤ t < 2005 0.112*** 0.042*** -0.023*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.012)
2005 ≤ t < 2010 0.014 0.006 -0.044***
(0.023) (0.012) (0.014)
2010 ≤ t ≤ 2015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.061***
(0.025) (0.012) (0.013)
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Tobin’s Q) defined as the market value of equity plus debt, divided
by the stock of fixed capital. This table summarizes the results of a single regression. Specifically,
it reports the coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH), ln(SPILLSIC), and
ln(R&D/Capital) in the specification in column (2) of Table 2 to vary over time. Column (1)
reports the estimates for the coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed to vary in each 5-
year time frame. Column (2) and (3) report the estimates of the coefficients on ln(SPILLSIC) and
ln(R&D/Capital) in each 5-year time period, respectively. Standard errors in brackets are robust
to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 7: Patent Equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SPILLTEC) ln(SPILLSIC) ln(R&D/capital)
Baseline (1985 ≤ t < 1990) 0.182*** -0.075** 0.161***
(0.064) (0.032) (0.026)
1990 ≤ t < 1995 0.067 0.065** -0.032*
(0.059) (0.032) (0.019)
1995 ≤ t < 2000 0.226*** -0.032 -0.02
(0.077) (0.032) (0.02)
2000 ≤ t ≤ 2005 0.131* -0.064* 0.095***
(0.077) (0.035) (0.022)
Notes: Dependent variable is citations-weighted patents. Estimation is conducted using the Neg-
ative Binomial model. This table summarizes the results of a single regression. Specifically, it re-
ports the coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH), ln(SPILLSIC), and ln(R&D
stock) in the specification in column (2) of Table 3 to vary over time. Column (1) reports the esti-
mates for the coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed to vary in each t-year time frame.
Column (2) and (3) report the estimates of the coefficients on ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D/Capital)
in each 5-year time period, respectively. Standard errors allow for serial correlation through clus-
tering by firm. Includes time dummies, four digit industry dummies and lagged firm sales. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 8: Productivity Equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SPILLTEC) ln(SPILLSIC) ln(R&D/capital)
Baseline (1985 ≤ t < 1990) 0.206*** -0.016** 0.008*
(0.022) (0.007) (0.005)
1990 ≤ t < 1995 0.008 0.012*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
1995 ≤ t < 2000 0.021** 0.010** 0.004
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003)
2000 ≤ t < 2005 -0.006 0.019*** 0.013***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.0003)
2005 ≤ t < 2010 -0.009 0.021*** 0.010***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.004)
2010 ≤ t ≤ 2015 -0.01 0.014** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(sales). This table summarizes the results of a single regres-
sion. Specifically, it reports the coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH),
ln(SPILLSIC), and ln(R&D/Capital) in the specification in column (2) of Table 4 to vary over
time. Column (1) reports the estimates for the coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed
to vary in each 5-year time frame. Column (2) and (3) report the estimates of the coefficients on
ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D stock) in each 5-year time period, respectively. Includes firm and year
fixed effects and controls for current and lagged industry sales in each firm’s output industry. Stan-
dard errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation
using the Newey-West correction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 9: R&D Equation
(1) (2)
ln(SPILLTEC) ln(SPILLSIC)
Baseline (1985 ≤ t < 1990) 0.138*** 0.025
(0.037) (0.017)
1990 ≤ t < 1995 -0.028* 0.003
(0.015) (0.008)
1995 ≤ t < 2000 -0.040** 0.018**
(0.018) (0.009)
2000 ≤ t < 2005 -0.025 0.042***
(-0.018) (0.009)
2005 ≤ t < 2010 -0.063*** 0.058***
(0.021) (0.01)
2010 ≤ t ≤ 2015 -0.097*** 0.059***
(0.022) (0.011)
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(sales). This table summarizes the results of a single regres-
sion. Specifically, it reports the coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH),
ln(SPILLSIC), and ln(R&D/Capital) in the specification in column (2) of Table 5 to vary over time.
Column (1) reports the estimates for the coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed to vary
in each 5-year time frame. Column (2) reports the estimates of the coefficients on ln(SPILLSIC)
in each 5-year time period. Includes firm and year fixed effects and controls for current and lagged
industry sales in each firm’s output industry. Standard errors in brackets are robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey-West correction. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Figure 1: Marginal Social Return to R&D
Median	Regression	Sample
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Median	Compustat	Y/G Aggregate	 Y/G
Notes: The figure plots the estimated marginal social return to R&D (MSR), which is calculated
as YG (ψ1 + ψ2), where
Y
G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ1 is the elasticity of production
with respect to the R&D stock, and ψ2 is the elasticity of production with respect to the technology
spillovers. ψ2 and ψ2 are estimated in Table 8. The solid black line uses the median R&D to sales
ratio in our sample of Compustat firms as the estimate of YG . The dotted blue line uses OECD data
on total business R&D in the US divided by US GDP as the estimate of YG . The dotted blue line
is normalized to equal the the solid black line in 1985 to highlight changes in the series over time.
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